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1In brief: the possibility of 
rapid transition
THE OBJECTIVE: THIS IS PART OF A LIVING 
EXERCISE TO IDENTIFY AND ENCOURAGE THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH RAPID AND FAIR 
TRANSITIONS TO LIVING WITHIN ENVIRONMENTAL 
THRESHOLDS BECOME POSSIBLE, DRAWING ON 
LESSONS FROM THE PAST AND PRESENT.
Is rapid transition possible? Sometimes events or new 
knowledge throw up reasons why we must make change 
happen quickly. We can end up doing things differently in 
ways which, moments before, seemed unimaginable. What 
pushes or pulls us is often something we don’t see coming 
– a volcano erupts, banks collapse, a wall falls or a conflict 
breaks out. Today that challenge is a civilisation, us, on the 
edge of irrevocably depleting the ecosystems which sustain 
it. It threatens to happen also in ways that will hurt its most 
vulnerable members first and worst, and bequeath our 
children and subsequent generations an irreversible legacy of 
increasing environmental chaos.
Politicians, and perhaps much of the rest of society, cannot 
imagine making the rapid transition necessary to prevent this 
happening. This pamphlet suggests we can, and that once 
we understand and accept the necessity of action, we’re even 
quite good at it. The past shows we can adapt fast. 
2HOW DID WE DO THAT?
The examples in this pamphlet were discussed in 
conversations around the UK over the course of a year. They 
are just a glimpse of where we might look to understand better 
and drive the dynamics of rapid transition. There is much 
to be learned, and we hope this encourages a much bigger 
conversation. Just from these examples, some patterns of rapid 
change emerge, such as: 
• we are actually good at adapting when the need  
arises
• fairness matters in periods of change and working 
together works
• public leadership is needed but often relies on agitation 
from elsewhere to come about
• there’s no one path
• boldness is effective but you need to connect actions 
with reasons
• inaction costs and seemingly hard courses can produce 
pleasant surprises
• accepting boundaries on things like consumption 
of resources can trigger innovation and bring other 
unexpected benefits
In other words, history suggests we can do this, and that we 
might be pleasantly surprised when we start actually trying. 
"The past is never dead. It's not even past."  William Faulkner
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The scene
Why seek change? Look around, there seems no shortage of 
reasons: failed financial and political systems, industries in 
decline, large scale poverty and widening inequality, to name 
just a few.
Alongside and related to these, however, is a crisis of another 
order. Humanity is overreaching its planetary boundaries in 
ways that are dismantling its ecological foundations.1 In climate 
change alone is a problem whose scale and comprehensive 
reach call for transformation rather than simple reform. 
But calls for rapid transition raise enormous questions. It 
is much easier, after all, to keep doing today what we did 
yesterday. We know that, imperceptibly, over time, all things 
change. But being called on, in a given moment, to start doing 
things differently is challenging for everyone. And for good 
reason.
We are currently locked in to a high-carbon global economy by 
multiple factors. They include energy-intensive infrastructure, 
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high-consumption culture, unequal distribution of political 
power within and between states, and an economic system 
dominated by finance that fails the poorest, takes infinite 
growth for granted, and resists reform, however broken it 
becomes.
This ‘lock in’ makes it difficult to either imagine, or believe 
in the possibility of transformative change. In a phrase that 
so well describes this prevailing sentiment that it has been 
attributed to several different people: “It is easier to imagine 
the end of the world than a change to the current economic 
system.” And yet, as it also says in Proverbs (29:18) “Where there 
is no vision, the people perish.” Visualising what can be done, 
inclusively and progressively, to bring about a sustainable 
society is therefore our challenge.
Precisely because of the difficulty in imagining a world 
transformed, the possibilities for rapid transition face a 
series of doubts that form obstacles to action. Among other 
arguments raised against the chances for transformation are: 
that incumbent interests are too powerful, it’s just too difficult 
to do, it costs too much and we cannot afford it, it needs a 
detailed blueprint which is lacking, the state won’t or can’t do 
anything, people aren’t culturally ready for change, and that all 
we really need is a smart, technological fix to these problems. 
Many of these barriers are real, but often exaggerated. Powerful 
incumbent interests do resist change, sometimes successfully, 
but they can be overcome. Transformations can cost a lot of 
money – but that money is readily made available when there 
is sufficient desire to mobilise it. States often do protect the 
status quo, but they can also act as leaders and innovators of 
progressive social and economic change. 
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Although every moment in time differs, such objections to 
the possibility of rapid transitions could be, and have been, 
applied throughout history. But, as this pamphlet illustrates, 
such transitions have and do happen. It may not be possible 
ever to point out exact parallels – times change, of course – 
but there are so many occasions in which remarkable shifts 
have happened in brief periods, that we would be missing 
a big trick not try to learn from them. There may be lessons 
both good and bad; and insights from only some parts of what 
has happened elsewhere, in other parts of the world, and in 
the past, may be transferrable. But just the small selection 
presented here suggests that we may uncover surprising and 
useful insights by looking at when, where, why and how rapid 
change has occurred. This pamphlet is merely an introduction, 
the result of a series of conversations had around the UK 
over the course of 18 months involving many groups and 
individuals, many of whom are named at the end.
If there is one key conclusion that goes against the grain 
of all the doubts mentioned above, it is that our collective 
capacity, ability and resourcefulness for change is much 
higher than is typically recognised.
This is, then, primarily an invitation to look more closely 
at past and present experience, to see what can be learned, 
positively and negatively. It’s also an invitation to work out 
how such lessons can be applied, in real time, to the ‘live’ 
experiment of attempting a rapid transition to the right side 
of critical environmental thresholds. Only by doing so can our 
society safeguard the ecological foundations of society and do 
so in a fair and equitable way.
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We want to enlarge the conversation about rapid transition, 
and ensure that its best insights are brought directly to bear  
on how we live and make decisions – from the home, to 
local life, the workplace, to governments and international 
institutions.
Several groups and individuals are already active in trying to 
make this happen. Many more are needed. It requires ongoing 
research, observation, talking about it, and then walking the 
talk, making changes to what we do every day.
Only in this way might we overcome the ironic maxim of 
medieval historian Vasily Klyuchevsky, that:
 “History teaches us nothing but just punishes us for 
not learning its lessons”2
 
 
The clock: Accelerating transitions 
Recent times reveal that mainstream economic models and 
structures are failing: politically, ecologically, socially, and 
even on their own terms. 
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Climate science reveals that, depending on the degree of risk 
we are prepared to tolerate, we are either living through, on 
the cusp of, or rapidly approaching, an environmental domino 
effect set to usher an era of irreversible, catastrophic climatic 
upheaval. The question is: How do we escape, in time, and come 
out the better for it?
The latest international agreement on climate change signed 
in Paris in 2015 proved far more ambitious than many had 
expected, aiming to hold global warming to 1.5°C above pre-
industrial levels, and at least “well below 2°C”. But even 2°C 
requires emissions reductions well beyond what many climate 
scientists, economists, NGOs and commentators believe is 
likely on current trends, or judge as economically viable.3 
Current national pledges leave us on course for warming of 
up to 3.4˚C, according to the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP), and only then if fully delivered. UNEP says 
they ‘will reduce emissions by no more than a third of the levels 
required by 2030 to avert disaster’.4 Whilst there is a wealth of 
research and experience in delivering incremental and relative 
reductions in emissions, there is little systematic analysis of 
the radical step-changes and rapid reductions that would align 
with the new international targets – either from a research or 
from a practitioner perspective.
For a sense of the scale and speed of transformation required, 
estimates from the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research 
suggest the need for annual, absolute reductions in emissions 
for already industrialised countries of between 10 - 20 percent, 
depending on the assumptions made and the amount of risk 
tolerated.5 Yet the UK landmark review of the economics of 
climate change known as the Stern review noted that annual 
8HOW DID WE DO THAT?
reductions of greater than 1 percent have “been associated only 
with economic recession or upheaval.”6 It points to the need for 
uncommon actions, transformation and rapid transition. Not 
just in response to the threat of climate change, but to other, 
often closely related, crises in food systems, forest and marine 
ecosystems and stresses to water and biodiversity that further 
imperil us. 
 
Complex circumstances and themes
For convenience, the examples that follow are broadly organised 
under cases of rapid changes predominantly to infrastructure, 
the economy and culture. 
But many exhibit characteristics of more than one, or all three, 
of these dimensions. 
They illustrate a wide range of processes of change, bottom-
up, top-down and combinations of both. Similarly there are 
examples of both planned and emergent, haphazard transitions 
and combinations of the two. The same can be said for 
incidents of centralised and decentralised change, and those 
occurring on a political spectrum of democratic to autocratic 
organisation. Some are driven in response to external economic, 
environmental or political shocks. Others ride in the wake of 
new technological disruptions and opportunities, and cultural 
shifts.
The point in all cases is beginning to build a greater 
understanding of the dynamics of rapid transition so that, faced 
with the immediate challenge of making a rapid transition to 
live and thrive, with fairness, within planetary boundaries, we 
might make the best possible choices. 
THE POSSIBILITY OF RAPID TRANSITION
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How we’ve changed
RESISTANCE TO CHANGE AS PART OF HUMAN 
NATURE IS OFTEN INVOKED AGAINST THE 
POSSIBILITY OF CHANGE. BUT HUMAN NATURE 
PROVES TO BE IMMENSELY VARIED ACROSS TIME 
AND SPACE AND ALSO IN TERMS OF HOW ANY 
GIVEN INDIVIDUAL OR COMMUNITY IS CAPABLE OF 
CHANGING. 
We may well labour under profound misconceptions about our 
capacity for rapid change as much as we do about the values 
we believe to be held by others. In cultures where competitive, 
selfish individualism is embedded in the economic model it’s 
easy to believe that such anti-public, cooperative and communal 
values are also the default for most people. This matters because 
such perceptions and misperceptions reinforce apathy and 
cynicism, and block our willingness to act or support change. 
In a ground-breaking recent survey by the Common Cause 
Foundation, people were asked to talk about their own values 
and what they thought were the values of others.7 Regardless 
of age, geography, wealth and voting behaviour, people attach 
more importance to compassionate values – embracing justice, 
tolerance and responsibility – than to wealth, image and 
ambition – so called selfish values. 74 percent of us prioritise in 
this way. But when asked about the values we think others hold, 
77 percent of us think others hold predominantly selfish values. 
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Yet recent generational shifts in attitudes to things like drinking 
and driving, smoking and various kinds of open prejudice all 
point to the possibility of progressive behavioural changes. 
For more, hugely diverse examples that indicate our capacity 
to accommodate and engineer rapid changes in circumstance, 
read on.
When volcanoes erupt
In the early hours of Wednesday 14 April 2010, a dormant 
volcano, covered in ice, with a hard-to-pronounce name 
– Eyjafjallajökull – exploded. Nobody heard it across the 
mainland of northern Europe because the volcano was far away 
in Iceland, but the skies above them fell silent. Within hours, 
airports all over Europe were closing as if a giant master switch 
for the aviation industry had been flicked to ‘off’. Fine dust 
from the cloud thrown up by the volcano is lethal to modern jet 
engines. For days Europe was grounded. “Five miles up the hush 
and shush of ash/ Yet the sky is as clean as a white slate,” wrote the 
poet Carol Ann Duffy.
One of the main arteries of the modern world – cheap, 
ubiquitous air travel – was suddenly cut. What happened next 
was revelatory, and a demonstration of how rapidly we can 
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adapt to live without seemingly indispensable facets of modern 
life. It was also a glimpse of a future in which climate change, 
and ultimately limited oil supplies, have clipped the industry’s 
wings.
Stranded travellers, philosophers and poets filled the airwaves 
with reflections. Yes, it was inconvenient, they said, no one was 
prepared. But, supermarkets quickly substituted local produce 
for perishable, luxury horticultural goods normally flown in; 
delivery companies switched transport modes, business people 
took to video conferencing, and Norway’s prime minister, 
Jens Stoltenberg, stranded in New York, ran the Norwegian 
government from the United States on his new iPad. Suddenly 
the skies were peaceful and people found other ways to get from 
one place to another. They took trains, buses, taxis and, aided by 
social media, shared cars, rooms and experiences. They talked 
to each other and, travelling at a slower pace, found themselves 
enjoying the scenery and being more aware of the world they 
were passing through. 
Strikingly, given that flying was something many thought we 
couldn’t live without, the world did not come to a standstill. 
The sky didn’t fall, it just looked more peaceful. We heard more 
clearly, as Duffy wrote, “the birds sing in the Spring”. Almost 
everything simply carried on. Spare capacity in other transport 
modes was taken up, flexible communications allowed people 
to be present virtually where they couldn’t be physically, and 
supply and delivery chains adapted. The airlines suffered 
economically, but it revealed how few of the things we depend 
on for day-to-day life really relied on the airlines. Life would be 
different without them (or far fewer of them) but life would go 
on, as it had done for thousands of years. 
THE POSSIBILITY OF RAPID TRANSITION
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When you need to act in  
extreme circumstances
It can be in the direst of circumstances that the boldest 
experiments may emerge – the idea of ‘paradise built in hell’ as 
the writer Rebecca Solnit puts it. Although barely reported, just 
such an experiment is happening in the autonomous Kurdish 
region of Northern Syria, Rojava.8
There, Syrian Kurds have set up a secular, ethnically inclusive 
and bottom-up democratic system. They struggle, successfully 
so far, against attempts by ISIS to erode their territory, aided 
by a feminist army – the Union of Free Women (or YJA Star) – 
and, on a day to day basis, a significant part of the economy is 
run by women-only co-operatives, who are also key to feeding 
the people. The academic David Graeber describes Rojava as a 
“remarkable democratic experiment… despite the hostility of almost 
all of its neighbours.”
Under extreme economic duress Argentina turned its back on 
international financial orthodoxy by defaulting on debt, which 
formed part of its long-term strategy to recover following the 
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country’s banking collapse in 2000. But the initial economic 
failure revealed something else, a great capacity for rapid, 
autonomous adaptation at local level. Huertas comunitarias, 
or community gardens, sprang up everywhere, such as in the 
La Boca district of Buenos Aires. Alongside them, community 
kitchens were also established. And things went much 
further in Argentina, as whole arms of government ceased to 
function properly. El Movimiento de Trabajadores Desocupados, 
the Movement of Unemployed Workers, brought assembled 
groups together to do everything from making food, to building 
shelters, creating markets for people to sell their products, 
schooling and, also, demonstrating. They created, in effect, a 
parallel economy. Panaderia, bloquera and ropero – bakeries, 
block making, and clothes making and selling – were a 
particular focus, the very basics of a livelihood: food, shelter 
and clothing. One such group, CTDAV, had 15,000 members and 
paid out 9,000 unemployment benefits per month in 2002.9
When crisis hit Greece, people similarly turned their backs on 
a failed mainstream to grow their own parallel economy. In the 
Greek port city of Volos, eggs, milk and jam at market could be 
bought using a new informal barter currency, a Local Alternative 
Unit, or TEM as was known locally. The system combines an 
element of barter with an alternative currency. Similar systems 
are emerging around Greece and are being used for basics like 
food as well as business and services, with groups like the Volos 
network enjoying more than 800 members.
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When work changes
Responding to a recession in the early 1990s, the public sector 
in the Netherlands began offering a four-day week to staff to 
save money. Since then it has spread and become common 
employment practice, with the option offered to workers in all 
sectors of the economy. As a result, job-sharing has become 
the norm in the health and education sectors. It is common to 
have part-time surgeons, engineers and bankers making the 
much hyped work-life balance in modern industrial economies 
a practical reality. One in three men either work part time or 
compress their hours, working five days in four to enjoy a three-
day weekend. Three quarters of women work part time. The 
popularity of the different pattern is such that 96 percent of part 
time workers do not want to work longer hours.
It’s not just liberal Northern Europe that’s seen the benefits 
of shorter working weeks. In the United States, in the midst 
of the financial crisis in 2008 – faced with recession, rapidly 
rising energy prices, growing lines at food banks, rising 
unemployment and mortgage foreclosures – instead of simply 
bringing a knife to public spending and pushing austerity 
measures, Jon Hunstman, Utah’s Republican Governor, 
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surprised people with an experiment to save money. At only a 
month’s notice, 18,000 of the state’s 25,000 workforce were put 
on a four-day week and around 900 public buildings closed on 
Fridays. The impact of the scheme was studied. Eight out of ten 
employees liked it and wanted it to continue. Nearly two thirds 
said it made them more productive, and many said it reduced 
conflict both at home and at work. Workplaces across the state 
reported higher staff morale and lower absenteeism. There 
were other surprises. One in three among the public thought 
the new arrangements actually improved access to services. 
It wasn’t the main objective, but at a stroke the four-day week 
also reduced carbon emissions by 14 percent, a huge annual, 
climate-friendly saving. In a sign of the growing appeal of the 
idea, in 2013 the Gambia introduced a four-day week for public 
sector workers.
When culture shifts
Advertising locks in the culture of consumerism. Its messages 
that define us first and foremost as consumers far outweigh 
visible invitations to think of ourselves as citizens with broader, 
extended responsibilities. It’s a key cultural dimension that 
makes it hard to imagine, or believe in, the possibility of rapid 
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change. Materialism and related overconsumption display 
self-reinforcing and negative dynamics. Numerous, replicated 
studies, summarised by Prof Tim Kasser, show that holding 
more materialistic values is an indicator for having relatively 
lower levels of well-being.10 Merely being exposed to images of 
consumer goods triggers materialistic concerns, which makes 
us feel worse, and is linked to more anti-social behaviour. 
Children exposed to advertising are seen to be less likely to 
interact socially. Other studies show how simply referring 
to people as consumers rather than citizens triggers more 
competitive and selfish behaviour. 
To combat what they called the visual pollution of excessive 
advertising, in 2007 Brazil’s biggest city, São Paulo, led by the 
city’s conservative mayor, Gilberto Kassab, introduced the Clean 
City Law. The result was a near-total ban affecting billboards, 
digital signs and advertising on buses. Several US states 
strongly control public advertising too, and in Paris, recent 
rules reduce advertising on the city’s streets by 30 per cent 
and cap the size of hoardings. No adverts are allowed within 
50 metres of school gates. The Indian city of Chennai banned 
billboard advertising, and Grenoble in France recently banned 
commercial advertising in public places in the city’s streets, to 
enhance opportunities for non-commercial expression. Several 
hundred advertising signs were replaced by tree planting and 
community noticeboards. 
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When new movements emerge
Across the spectrum from the Tea Party in the United States 
to the Occupy movement in several countries, insurgent civil 
society groups have rapidly shifted political agendas. From 
radicalising the right wing to radically raising the importance of 
inequality, established political formulas have been shown to 
be subject to sudden shifts in response to committed agitation. 
Other new social movements have emerged with more practical 
and less explicitly political objectives: for example, the Transition 
Town movement. This only began in 2007, but is now present 
in over 40 countries and has hundreds of initiatives in the UK 
alone. 11 One thing they have in common is ‘just doing it!’ The 
approach drives practical initiatives toward more sustainable 
local economies focusing on food, energy generation, transport 
housing and whatever captures the imagination of the local 
community. Diverse in focus, they are all about producing a more 
sustainable economy. The Buen Vivir approach in Latin America 
with strong roots in Bolivia and Ecuador, which has grown rapidly 
in a similar timeframe, is closely related, embracing the ‘right to a 
good life and the rights of nature’.
Then there are the many creative protest groups, many of which 
also become involved in long-term alliances for change, supporting 
individuals and communities caught in economic struggles.
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How we’ve changed the 
world around us
THE PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE OF THE WORLD 
AROUND US IS TYPICALLY EXPERIENCED AS A 
MOSTLY FIXED, IF SLOWLY EVOLVING FEATURE OF 
OUR LIVES. BUT THERE ARE TIMES WHEN IT HAS 
CHANGED WITH EXTREME RAPIDITY, CHANGING 
ALSO HOW WE LIVE.
When homes are needed
Current estimates suggest that to meet housing demand 
in England, driven by a shift to one-person households, 
increasing life expectancy and population increase, additional 
housing of between 232,000 to 300,000 new units per year are 
needed, which is between two and three times current supply. 
It’s a problem hugely exacerbated by the large and growing gap 
between house prices and wages. Neither modern Labour or 
Conservative governments have been able to solve the problem 
in the UK. 
But relatively recent history demonstrates a country’s ability to 
operate at scale and speed to solve such an infrastructure crisis 
and market failure. Astonishing by contemporary standards, 
in Britain’s battered and far more indebted post-World War 
II condition, the number of homes for social housing built 
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annually by local authorities under a Conservative government 
in the early 1950s hit 250,000. Under a Labour government, 
the years 1967–68 saw around 200,000 homes built for social 
housing. The private sector built a similar number. But the levels 
of ambition for the public sector providing affordable homes 
fell off a cliff in the 1980s. In comparison, during 2014–15 just 
1,350 homes were completed by local authorities in England, 
and the private sector built less than half what it did during the 
mid-1960s. 
 
 
When you need to get around
State-led financing of new infrastructures has many precedents. 
Post-war, the productive capacity of the recovering United States 
meant that, for example, from 1956 the US Interstate Highway 
System managed to build 47,000 miles of highway in just over 
three decades, changing the landscape for both business and 
society. 
The emergence of the modern, global containerised shipping 
industry closely echoes the growth of the aviation industry’s 
infrastructure. Both grew rapidly in the few decades after 
the Second World War, enabling a dramatic acceleration of 
world trade. One of our current challenges is how these fossil 
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fuel-intensive networks lock us in to a high carbon emission 
global economy, creating a kind of path dependency. But 
these examples weren’t the first time that new transport 
infrastructures were rapidly rolled out.
Boldness was a feature of the early roll-out of new transport 
infrastructure in Britain. Whereas it took a period of 15 years in 
recent times simply to electrify 390 miles of existing track on 
the UK’s East Coast Mainline, engineering endeavour between 
1845 and 1852 saw rapid infrastructure development when 4,400 
miles of railway track were laid in Britain. On a single weekend 
in1892, engineers began a project of breathtaking ambition by 
contemporary standards. It began on the morning of Saturday 
21 May and was finished by 4am on the following Monday 
morning. In just two days a small, perfectly coordinated army 
of 4,200 workers laid a total of 177 miles of track along the Great 
Western route to the South West, converting the old broad gauge 
lines to the new standard, or narrow gauge. When governments 
throw their weight behind new infrastructures, they can be 
rolled out at remarkable speed.
THE POSSIBILITY OF RAPID TRANSITION
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When you need clean energy 
Renewable energy is confounding claims that it cannot rise to 
the challenge of substituting for fossil fuels, overcome problems 
of infrastructure and expand at scale and speed. Increasingly, 
approaches to community ownership are also broadening 
the spread of economic benefits and raising enthusiasm for 
transition. In early 2017 the International Energy Agency noted 
that renewables were growing 13% more between 2015 and 2021 
than they did in the previous year’s forecast, with the costs 
expected to drop by a quarter in the field of solar PV and 15 
percent for onshore wind.12
In 2015 Costa Rica generated 99% of its electricity from 
renewable sources, and for 285 days its grid went 100% 
renewable. In Europe, Portugal reported a period of continuous 
days when its electricity came just from wind, solar and 
hydropower. With an enlightened policy framework, in the 
two decades from 1983 wind power was providing 39 percent 
of Danish electricity. Sonderborg in Denmark – a centre for 
technology research and roll-out – is like a green Silicon Valley.
25
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Interestingly, the human brain needs less energy to function 
than an old light bulb, so quite why we’re making such a mess 
of energy policy, is genuinely hard to understand.
The UK is a windy place and we have in total about 14 GW 
installed capacity of wind energy. But we’ve barely scratched 
the surface of our potential, and the rise of fracking implies 
we seem almost wilfully to cling to the fossil fuel past. Even in 
the United States, 8GW of wind were installed in 2015. China 
introduced much more than the UK total, nearly 20GW, in a 
single year (2014). 
Work at Stanford University produced scenarios whereby every 
state in the US could be 80-85% renewable by 2030 and 100% 
by 2050.13 What's more, since 2013 the world has been adding 
more renewable energy capacity than coal, natural gas, and 
oil combined. Countries such as Uruguay have committed to 
derive 94.5% of their electricity from renewable energy.14 Even 
Saudi Arabia – the ultimate petro-state – recently signalled an 
end to oil addiction in its Vision 2030 plan. 
The future is voting with its feet for a more decentralised, 
renewable and, importantly, mutually owned energy system. 
According to the UK’s former Department for Energy and 
Climate Change, community-owned renewable energy projects 
give 12 to 13 times more value to communities and local areas 
than those which are privately owned – through more jobs 
and investment returns staying locally. Germany has over 900 
energy cooperatives who enjoy the right to sell energy directly 
to third parties – and in Hamburg, famously, citizen action led 
to the grid coming back into public control.
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When the world suddenly shifts
Resilience and the ability to make a rapid, low carbon transition 
in the key areas of food and energy are demonstrated by a very 
particular post-Cold War example – almost laboratory-like 
in terms of its isolation and concentrated immediacy. Cuba’s 
transition was a dramatic response drawing both on grassroots 
community action, and government planning. In the so-called 
‘special period’, while still under a US economic embargo, 
the country lost access to cheap Soviet oil after 1990. From 
transport, to energy and high input farming, Cuba had been 
heavily dependent on imported fossil fuels from the former 
Soviet Union. 
But with the USSR’s collapse, almost overnight oil imports 
dropped by around half. The impact on food availability was 
such that the average Cuban’s calorie intake fell by over one 
third in the course of around five years. In response, walking and 
cycling increased and there was a rapid increase in community-
based urban organic agriculture. The share of physically active 
adults more than doubled, while obesity halved. In just five 
years between 1997 and 2002, according to the American 
Journal of Epidemiology, deaths due to diabetes fell by half, 
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coronary heart disease by over one third, stroke by one in five, 
and all causes by just under one fifth. Half the food consumed 
in the capital, Havana, became grown in the city’s own gardens 
and, overall, urban gardens provided 60 per cent of the salad 
vegetables eaten in Cuba. Havana alone ended up with more 
than 26,000 food gardens. The Cuban experience both echoes 
and – statistically, at least – surpassed what America achieved 
in its lauded push for ‘Victory Gardening’ during the Second 
World War.
Likewise a ‘Revolución Energética’ moved the country to a more 
efficient, decentralised system with smaller generator stations 
and shorter distances to transmit energy. Old, inefficient 
incandescent light bulbs were removed almost entirely, by 
mandate, in just six months. Fidel Castro’s comment at the 
time was: ‘We are not waiting for fuel to fall from the sky, because 
we have discovered, fortunately, something much more important: 
energy conservation, which is like finding a great oil deposit.’ 
Relatively high community resilience and adaptive capacity in 
Cuba, embedded in planning approaches and neighbourhood 
mobilisation, also becomes apparent in its response to climate 
related shocks. An estimated 1,700 deaths occurred from the 
impact of Hurricane Katrina in the United States, whereas there 
were low-to-no deaths in Cuba when the country was hit by 
an extreme weather event of similar force, Hurricane Wilma: 
640,000 people were evacuated, with one fatality in total 
recorded. And, while the sea encroached 1km inland, Havana 
was flooded but suffered no deaths or injuries.
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How we’ve changed the 
economy
IN CONTEMPORARY NEOLIBERAL ECONOMIES 
WHICH HAVE LIVED WITH THE POLICY MANTRA  
OF THERE BEING ‘NO ALTERNATIVE’, 
FUNDAMENTAL SHIFTS IN THE ECONOMY ARE 
PERHAPS AMONG THE HARDEST CHANGES TO 
IMAGINE OR BELIEVE IN. 
As mentioned in the introduction, it can be easier to imagine the 
end of the world, than to believe we can organise its business 
differently. But again, even very recent history suggests that 
seemingly locked-in practices and assumptions can be dropped 
overnight.
 
When Banks Fail
The notion that you can’t ‘buck the markets’ was turned on its 
head by the 2007–2008 crisis when financial markets realised 
they couldn’t survive without a massive public bailout and long-
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term support. Perhaps it’s not difficult to imagine huge resource 
mobilisation during wartime, but the imminent collapse of the 
financial system revealed other circumstances in which the 
state demonstrates its ability to act at scale with speed. The 
novelist and observer of modern banking, John Lanchester, 
made this observation in his book about the financial crisis, 
Whoops!: ‘The amount of state intervention (in the banking system) 
in the US and UK at this moment is at a level comparable to that of 
wartime. We have in effect had to declare war to get us out of the 
hole created by our economic system.’ 
Lanchester was referring to the amount of money created by 
central banks and pumped into the financial system. It was used 
to recapitalise the banks after the financial crisis had destroyed 
money and the banks’ balance sheets. The method was given 
the technical term ‘quantitative easing’, but it was in effect 
printing money. In the UK the sum reached £375 billion, with 
an extra £75 billion allocated to weather the impact of leaving 
the European Union. To put that figure into context, it is about 
double the UK’s combined health and education budget in 2017. 
In the United States between 2008 and 2015 a breathtaking sum 
of $3.7 trillion was mobilised. Meanwhile, across the European 
Union, the European Central Bank has been injecting €80 billion 
per month to stimulate the economy, a figure which only fell in 
2017 to €60 billion.
A year before the crash in 2006, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
Gordon Brown, had boasted about the UK’s successful light 
touch financial regulation. Later, the nationalisation of key 
banks like RBS to save them from collapse represented a 
previously unimaginable ideological reversal in government. 
There was, however, a missed opportunity in not changing 
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the mission of banks explicitly to support the productive 
economy, and in the targeting of cash injections which tended 
merely to inflate the price of luxury assets. The alternative was 
highlighted by a report called the Green New Deal, published 
in 2008, which estimated that the annual spending needed in 
the UK to set the country on a path to low carbon transition was 
around £50 billion.15 That was not simply a ‘cost’ as it would 
have an economic multiplier effect, generate economic activity, 
creating jobs and tax revenues. It’s a sum coincidentally similar, 
in proportion to national income, to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
New Deal programme in the United States. 
 
 
 
 
 
When a country needs a new deal
The New Deal was a rapid, broad, state designed and led 
transformation plan in response to massive market failure in 
the financial system. 
Roosevelt’s famous programme delivered in his ‘first hundred 
days’ remains a benchmark against which the achievements 
of new administrations are measured. Few have come close. 
In his first three months in office Roosevelt passed 15 different 
bills through Congress. It was a multi-faceted programme. The 
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vigour, confidence, breadth and imagination of the programme 
is by modern standards extraordinary. A new bank holiday was 
created to calm fears and take action on the banks, America was 
taken off the gold standard, the Glass-Steagall Act separated 
retail from ‘casino’ speculative banking, new financial 
regulators were created, a huge programme of rural relief was 
complemented by an equally large public works programme, 
and 250,000 conservation jobs were created in national parks 
and forests.
In addition to reforms of the banking system, the New Deal 
oversaw a period of compression of inequality generally, an 
improvement in gender equality, a major programme of new 
public housing and significant environmental works through 
the creation of the Civilian Conservation Corps.
It has been estimated that between January 1933 and December 
1940, $21.1 billion was spent on public relief and federal works 
programmes under Roosevelt’s New Deal. This amounted to 
about 3½ per cent of total GDP over the same period, and would 
have been equivalent to £50 billion a year in the UK in the post-
crash period, or roughly $500 billion in the US.
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When a nation re-invents itself
Iceland was at the heart of financial crisis in late 2008 and 
nearly destroyed by it. It built its economy around speculative 
finance but, after the meltdown, a ‘pots and pans’ revolution 
led to a process to draft a new citizen-drafted constitution, 
engaging half the electorate. Rather than making the public 
pay for the crisis, as the Nobel economist Paul Krugman points 
out, the country, ‘let the banks go bust and actually expanded 
its social safety net’ and instead of placating financial markets, 
‘imposed temporary controls on the movement of capital to 
give itself room to manoeuvre.’16 The constitutional exercise 
proposed a new approach to the ownership of natural resources 
for public good. Iceland now gets all its electricity and heat 
from renewable sources.
The crowd-sourced constitution ultimately fell foul of legal 
technicalities and the Supreme Court, but that didn’t stop the 
new mood creating lasting conditions for change and the desire 
for new economic approaches. Where other countries largely 
let banks off the hook, in 2015 Iceland’s Supreme Court upheld 
convictions against bankers at the heart of the crisis. Finance is 
now so sensitive that when the Prime Minister was caught up in 
revelations from the release of the so-called Panama Papers, he 
was forced from office.
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When an industry becomes obsolete
Historically states have also played a key role in managing 
adaptations to external shocks or re-wiring their economies 
in line with shifting domestic needs and global demands. This 
shows, for example, that large-scale industrial conversion is 
possible. As the Cold War wound down and ended, in the UK, 
between 1980 and 2005 an estimated 265,000 jobs were lost from 
the production of military equipment. The job losses resulted 
from a combination of reorganisation and rationalisation of 
the arms industry, cuts in UK military spending and a fall in 
exports. Although there was no stated policy on industrial 
conversion in this period, spending on military research and 
development (R&D) fell by around 70 percent between 1990 and 
2011, and civilian R&D rose by a similar amount, resulting in an 
estimated 50,000 – 100,000 new jobs. 
A huge disparity nevertheless remains between government-
funded military R&D and that for renewable energy, by a 
factor of 24:1 in 2013-2014, according to Scientists for Global 
Responsibility. Employment in the growing UK renewable 
energy sector, however, rose to 110,000 by 2011 (although 
subsequently falling due to the reduction of incentives and 
policy uncertainty). In Germany, backed by government, 
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corporate and trade union support, at the factory level over a 
10 year period, manufacturer MAK shifted from making tanks 
to train locomotives, and Airbus Helicopters went from 100 
percent military manufacture to 80 percent civilian.
The military and defence sectors tend to be capital intensive, so 
reorientation to other, more employment-rich sectors can more 
than compensate during conversion in terms of protecting jobs. 
Compared to military expenditure, according to research from 
the University of Massachusetts, where just employment was 
concerned, for every dollar invested, health care and housing 
both produced 50 per cent more jobs, education 107 per cent 
and public transport 131 per cent.
The UK has seen attempts by workers in the arms trade to re-
boot their industries for more socially productive purposes. 
The Lucas Plan was one when, in January 1976, workers at 
Lucas Aerospace published an Alternative Plan for the future 
of their corporation. It was a novel response to management 
announcements that thousands of manufacturing jobs were 
to be cut in the face of industrial restructuring, international 
competition, and technological change. Instead of redundancy, 
workers argued for socially useful production. In promoting 
their arguments, shop stewards at Lucas attracted workers 
from other sectors, community activists, radical scientists and 
environmentalists. 17 
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When conflict calls
“If only we could tackle the problems of peace with the same 
energy and whole-heartedness as we tackle those of war! 
Defence is old-established as a proper object for the State, 
whereas economic well-being is still a parvenu. Social action 
which is universally approved for the former purpose is still 
suspect when it is for the latter.” 
J.M. Keynes, 193818
Here is a case of rapid shifts in culture, economy and 
infrastructure. However true, Keynes’ lament is a potent 
counter to those who argue that the state is largely powerless 
in the modern world. It does, in fact, prove perfectly capable 
of making things happen when something is seen as a priority. 
Huge resources, both physical and financial, can be mobilised 
rapidly by the state when faced with a physical or financial 
threat to its well-being and survival. Banking crises and 
conflict demonstrate both.
Surprisingly, though, just as with the challenge of climate 
change, that doesn’t mean such things happen easily without 
agitation. In 1936, as the world enjoyed Germany’s hospitality 
for the pomp and ceremony of Olympic Games, it took 
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Winston Churchill to berate the British establishment for its 
complacency. He was, he said, “staggered” both by the speed of 
the onset of the danger represented by Hitler’s Germany, and 
“by the failure of the House of Commons to react effectively 
against those dangers.” Many in the British establishment 
opposed going to war with Germany and sought instead an 
accommodation with the Third Reich. Churchill’s agitation 
and his taking the role of Prime Minister (instead of someone 
who favoured appeasement, like Lord Halifax) made a decisive 
difference. His talent for rhetoric, demonstrated here, turned 
the Parliamentary tide:
“Owing to past neglect, in the face of the plainest warnings, 
we have now entered upon a period of danger . . . The era of 
procrastination, of half-measures, of soothing and baffling 
expedients, of delays, is coming to its close. In its place we 
are entering a period of consequences…”
Similarly, apart from Keynes’ detailed policy work, it was for 
his agitation in forcing the establishment to confront the need 
to mobilise resources that he was praised by The Economist  
in 1939: 
“(Keynes’) great service has been to impel the so-called 
‘leaders of opinion’ to reveal the state of their ignorance on 
the central economic problem of the war.”
In How to Pay for the War, Keynes set out to “bring home the 
true nature of the war-time problems” and pointed out that 
even a “moderate development of the war effort necessitated a 
very large cut in general consumption”, and proposed a plan of 
compulsory saving, because taxes, rationing and mere scarcity 
were inadequate, backed with the promise of a payback at the 
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end of the war. Yet even with the spectre of Nazism looming, 
Keynes’ medicine was thought by many to be too strong. “My 
discomfort comes from the fact, now made obvious, that the 
general public are not in favour of any plan,” he wrote.
And yet Britain did make a rapid transition, mobilising quickly 
and comprehensively. And it did so in a way that reached 
up from the roots of civil society within communities, and 
down from government. Action took place amidst uncertainty 
and, even allowing for the special constitutional measures of 
wartime, within a functioning democracy. Actions were both 
planned, like the rationed war diet, and experimental, in areas 
ranging from taxation to the technology for combat. 
The Shadow Factory Plan – a secret repurposing of some 
existing factories for the war effort coupled with the 
building of new ones – was an early sign of the argument 
for mobilisation being won. Nine new covert factories were 
commissioned in 1936, with other factories converted, 
especially those used for vehicle manufacture. 
In the name of food security for the island nation of Britain, 
land use changed. Allotment numbers grew from 850,000 in 
1939 to 1,750,000 in 1943 and 10,000 square miles more land 
was brought into production. 
Dependence on food imports halved between 1939 and 1945 
and by 1943 there were 3,000 rabbit clubs and 4,000 pig clubs, 
the latter producing enough bacon for 150 million breakfasts. 
Overall food consumption went down 11 percent by 1944 
and eating patterns changed too. By 1944, 10 per cent of all 
food was being eaten in works and school canteens, cafes, 
and restaurants. Scrap metal was saved at the rate of 110,000 
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tonnes per week and 31,000 tonnes of kitchen waste was saved 
weekly by 1943, enough to feed 210,000 pigs.
Rationing, though seen as a hardship, was also carefully 
designed as a ‘scientific diet’ and for those on the Home Front, 
there were strong indicators of broad health improvements. 
Between 1937 and 1944 infant mortality (up to age one) fell 
from 58 per 1000, to 45 per 1000. And, from being relatively 
high during the 1930s, suicide rates also fell during the war.
Households changed behaviour and their energy uses. 
Domestic coal use was cut 25 percent between 1938 and 1944. 
Electrical appliance use dropped by 82 percent from 1938 – 
1944. Petrol for private cars was withdrawn in 1942 and private 
vehicle use ultimately went down by 95 percent, and, even 
with energy restrictions, public transport rose 13 percent. 
Spending on amusements also went up 10 percent.
Where changing behaviour with regard to consumption 
was concerned, generally, the government deliberately 
chose rationing over taxation for reasons that were rational 
and progressive. Taxation alone, it concluded, apart from 
disproportionately and unfairly placing a burden on the 
poor, would be too slow to change behaviour. Rationing was 
considered quicker and more equitable. Tradable rations were 
rejected through fear of encouraging fraud and inflation and 
‘undermining the moral basis of rationing’. The historian 
Mark Roodhouse derives specific lessons for policy-making. 
If transferred to now, government, he writes, would need to, 
“convince the public that rationing levels are fair; that the 
system is administered transparently and fairly; and that 
evaders are few in number, likely to be detected and liable to 
stiff penalties if found guilty”.
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The experience of collective action also created the 
background to the post-war social contract, including the 
massive expansion of social housing and the creation of 
the National Health Service. In short, intransigence and 
an establishment tendency toward appeasement were 
overcome by Britain to successfully prosecute a war against 
fascist Germany. It did so in a way which, although not easy, 
was transformative and had some surprisingly positive 
consequences for the health and well-being of the nation.
Parallels between war economies and mobilisation to 
prevent catastrophic climate change have been drawn by 
several figures. Former UK Foreign Secretary, the Rt. Hon. 
Margaret Beckett MP, spoke in the Annual Winston Churchill 
Memorial Lecture in April 2007 in New York on ‘Climate 
Change: The Gathering Storm’, saying: “It was a time when 
Churchill, perceiving the dangers that lay ahead, struggled to 
mobilise the political will and industrial energy of the British 
Empire to meet those dangers. He did so often in the face of strong 
opposition and not always with success: wasted opportunities 
that he subsequently referred to as ‘The Locust Years,’” … “It 
was his foresight and his determination to prepare for a threat 
which – to many – was still seemingly distant and uncertain 
that in the end guaranteed the liberty and indeed survival of my 
country and that of many others.” Tim Yeo, Conservative MP 
and former Chairman of the cross-party energy and climate 
change committee, commented in October 2010 that “cutting 
spending on low carbon technologies now would be like 
cutting the budget for Spitfires in 1939.” Whereas Stavros 
Dimas, the European Commissioner for the Environment 
in 2007, bringing a reputation as a hard-line free marketeer, 
said, “Damaged economies, refugees, political instability, and 
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the loss of life are typically the results of war. But they will also be 
the results of unchecked climate change… It is clear that the fight 
against climate change is much more than a battle. It is a world 
war that will last for many years… It is like a war because to reduce 
emissions something very like a war economy is needed.” 
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How we take the  
next steps
The examples described above are merely cursory and 
illustrative. Each, alone, might be the useful subject of extensive 
further research. 
And one purpose of this pamphlet and the conversations it 
emerged from is to invite a much bigger conversation about 
the issues it raises and the lessons it suggests. But taken 
together it demonstrates the real possibility of transformation 
and rapid transitions in how we live. That is because we have 
lived through and engineered them before.
This is not, however, an exercise in open-ended research for 
curiosity and its own sake, or the search for a perfect solution. 
Contrary to the assumptions of some economic doctrines, 
perfect information always eludes us, and we are charged 
with making decisions about our future in circumstances of 
flux, uncertainty and always imperfect knowledge. For this 
reason we are compelled to make choices based on our best 
understanding and judgement at any one moment. 
We hope to build a greater understanding of the context in 
which rapid changes have been made, for better or worse. By 
doing so, we might better be able to produce the conditions in 
which socially progressive, rapid transitions can be brought 
about. Then we face the unavoidable challenge to make them 
happen within necessary environmental time frames, so that 
we all may thrive within planetary boundaries.
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Many observations could be made of the cases described 
above, but a few in particular stand out:
1. Fairness matters: Demonstrable equity matters for the 
public acceptability of rapid change. This is especially true 
if and where there is any perceived sacrifice to be made for 
the greater good. It is for this reason that under economic 
austerity policies the issue of tax avoidance and high pay 
shot up the political agenda. 
2. Working together works and creates new possibilities: 
The experience of acting collectively to solve common 
challenges itself creates self-reinforcing possibilities for 
further transformative action, often unanticipated.
3. We’re actually good at change: New social norms can 
quickly take root in everything from working patterns, to 
transport use, attitudes surrounding prejudice, what is 
considered social or anti-social behaviour, and patterns of 
consumption in everything from food to drink, clothing, 
and social media. 
4. Public leadership is needed: Initial public investment in 
a sector or activity can leverage disproportionately larger 
levels of investment from other sources, and visible public 
sector leadership on issues can trigger broader change. For 
example, if government departments visibly shift to using 
renewable energy, public transport, ethical procurement 
and shorter hours, it sends a signal. More comprehensive 
approaches to change, embracing investment, cultural 
shifts, and new governance approaches, can lead to self-
reinforcing change. 
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5. There’s no one path: Rapid transitions can result from 
bottom up and top down approaches, and combinations 
of the two, but ensuring that top down approaches are 
equitable and inclusive is a key challenge.
6. Boldness is good: In economic terms, ‘shove’ rather 
than ‘nudge’ approaches are more likely to achieve rapid 
change. The rediscovery of industrial strategy shows there 
is scope for enlightened leadership and, despite economic 
orthodoxy, intervention in the market, instead of assuming 
all change must come from price signals.
7. Connect actions with reasons: In making the case for 
change it is important to keep links between cause and 
effect, in order that changes do not appear inexplicable 
and randomly imposed. Campaigns to reduce smoking 
and drink driving, for example, emphasise the damage it 
does not just to the smoker and drinker but to their nearby 
loved ones and others.
8. Inaction costs: It matters always to be clear about both the 
costs of inaction and the benefits of action.
9. Pleasant surprises do happen: Change always brings 
with it unplanned and unexpected consequences – but it 
can also bring unintended benefits, such as the well-being 
gains of shorter working weeks and the health benefits of 
rationing. 
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10. Agitation is necessary: Agitation in the face of 
overwhelming odds, and even likely failure, can be a 
common and necessary feature of great achievements. 
Movements for race and gender equality, and against 
colonialism and homophobia, show clearly how 
progressive political change from above – by governments 
and others – often has its roots in long fought struggles 
from below.  
11. Accepting boundaries triggers innovation: Setting new 
parameters around consumption – such as introducing 
safe limits on the burning of fossil fuels – can unleash 
innovation and reveal great, nascent adaptive capacity. 
Businesses, societies and whole economies adapt to new 
‘rules of the game’ remarkably quickly. 
12. Value experiences, not ‘stuff’: Material consumption 
of ‘stuff’ in rich industrialised countries can be 
substituted by spending on experiential activities that 
benefit well-being.
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Summary
THERE IS AN OVERWHELMING NEED FOR RAPID 
TRANSITION TO A MORE JUST AND SUSTAINABLE 
WAY OF LIVING. BUT WHAT THIS LOOKS LIKE IN 
PRACTICE WILL BE VERY DIFFERENT DEPENDING 
ON WHERE IN THE WORLD YOU ARE. 
There is now a huge economic opportunity and need to invest 
in a rapid transition – in time, money, creativity, innovation 
and confidence in society’s ability to bring about progressive 
change. 
The science is in place, the international agreements are 
signed, the technology is available but two key things are 
missing and they are linked: the political will to act at a scale 
and speed implied by the agreements that have been signed; 
and the belief that real change is possible. 
Yet history and recent experience suggests it is. We hope that 
we will help overcome the obstacles to change by looking 
more into these experiences, discussing them more publicly, 
and learning from and applying their lessons where relevant 
and appropriate.
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This pamphlet and project
Our ambition is to create and grow a conversation on rapid 
transition. And, to do that we will explore ways to share 
resources, activities and case studies to allow a ‘live’ dialogue 
to happen.
This pamphlet is published by the New Weather Institute, 
the ESRC STEPS Centre and the Centre for Global Political 
Economy, University of Sussex. 
The initiative draws on and develops the contents of others 
and from the series of related workshops and events held 
in Oxford, Manchester, Uppsala, the Centre for Alternative 
Technology, Brighton, Hay and Dartington. These have been 
organised in association with the New Weather Institute, 
the University of Sussex and the STEPS Centre, and partners 
including LMH, Oxford, the Centre for Alternative Technology, 
the Manchester Tyndall Centre for Climate Research, 
Brighton Kurdistan Solidarity, Sussex Humanities Lab, the 
Institute of Development Studies, the Science Policy Research 
Unit, University of Sussex, Uppsala Centre for Sustainable 
Development, the Sigtuna Foundation, What Next Forum, 
Schumacher College, School of Design, Carnegie Mellon 
University and Polden Puckham Charitable Foundation.
Organisations active on transformations  
and rapid transitions:
New Weather Institute — newweather.org
The ESRC STEPS Centre — steps-centre.org 
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The Centre for Alternative Technology (CAT) — cat.org.uk
10:10 — 1010uk.org
Centre for Industrial Energy, Materials and Products (CIE-
MAP), Leeds University — ciemap.leeds.ac.uk
Open University: Stories of Change — storiesofchange.ac.uk 
RapidShift.net (USA)
Oxfam — oxfam.org
History and Policy Network — historyandpolicy.org
Friends of the Earth Big Ideas Project —  foe.co.uk/bigideas
Scientists for Global Responsibility — sgr.org.uk
New Economics Foundation — neweconomics.org
Greenhouse — greenhousethinktank.org 
Beautiful Solutions — solutions.thischangeseverything.org
People who have taken part in and 
contributed to the transformations and 
rapid transition seminars 
Bengi Akbulut
Nadje Al-Ali, SOAS, University of London
Paul Allen, Centre for Alternative Technology
Prof Kevin Anderson, Manchester/Upsalla University 
Prof John Barratt, Leeds University
Janet Biehl, translator of Revolution in Rojava: Democratic 
Confederalism and Women’s Liberation in Northern Syria
Brenda Boardman, ECI Oxford
Debbie Bookchin, journalist and author
David Boyle, author & New Weather Institute
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Clare Brass, Royal College of Art ‘Sustain’ programme
Kat Braybrooke, Sussex Humanities Lab, University of Sussex 
Prof Emeritus Victoria Chick, UCL
Deniz Çifçi, University of St Andrews
Molly Conisbee, Bristol University
Creative Technology Group, University of Sussex
Prof Danny Dorling, University of Oxford
Maurice Glasman, London Metropolitan University, Oxford 
University & Queen Mary’s College London
Dr Amber Huff, Institute of Development Studies 
Patrick Huff, Birkbeck, University of London
Howard Johns, author of The Energy Revolution
Isabel Käser, SOAS, University of London
Ruth Kinna, Loughborough University
Alice Bows Larkin, Manchester University 
Neal Lawson, Compass & Progressive Alliance
Ann Light, School of Engineering and Informatics, University of 
Sussex
Caroline Lucas MP, Green Party
Lindsay Mackie, New Weather Institute
Jo Magpie, Brighton Kurdistan Solidarity
Prof Mary Mellor, Northumbria University
Prof Richard Murphy, City University
Zaid Nasution, University of Leeds
Prof Peter Newell, Sussex University
Cemal Ozkahraman, Sussex Kurdish Community
Stuart Parkinson, Scientists for Global Responsibility
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Ruth Potts, Schumacher College
Alex Pritchard, University of Exeter
Somayeh Rostampour, University of Paris 8
Alan Rusbridger, Principal, Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford 
University
Sardar Saadi, University of Toronto
Arianne Shahvisi, Brighton & Sussex Medical School
Andrew Sleigh, Lighthouse and Maker Assembly
Andrew Simms, New Weather Institute, Fellow, Centre for Global 
Political Economy, Sussex University
Dr Adrian Smith, STEPS Centre and SPRU, University of Sussex
Prof Ben Sovacool, SPRU, University of Sussex
Prof Andy Stirling, STEPS Centre and SPRU, University of Sussex
Latif Tas, SOAS, University of London
Omer Tekdemir, University of Leicester
Dr Geoff Tily, Senior Economist, TUC
Mehmet Ugur, Greenwich Political Economy Research Centre
Federico Venturini
Ersilia Verlinghieri, University of Leeds
Charlie Wilson, University of East Anglia
Useful sources
Common Cause (2016) Perceptions Matter: The Common 
Cause UK Values Survey
Douthwaite, R. (1996) Short Circuit: Strengthening Local 
Economies for Security in an Unstable World, Devon: Green 
books.
Green New Deal Group (2008) The Green New Deal, London: nef.
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Hopkins, R. (2015) 21 Stories of Transition, Devon: Transition 
Network.
Johns, H. (2015) Energy Revolution: Repowering the Energy 
System, Permanent Publications
Kasser, T. (2003) The High Price of Materialism, Massachusetts: 
MIT Press
Lanchester, J (2010) Whoops! Why Everyone Owes Everyone 
and No One Can Pay, W. F. Howes Limited.
Morehouse, W. (1997, 2nd ed) Building Sustainable 
Communities, New York, Bootstrap Press
Murphy, R. (2011) The Courageous State, London: Searching 
Finance
Perez, C. (2002) Technological Revolutions and Financial 
Capital: The Dynamics of Bubbles and Golden Ages 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar publishing
Scoones, I., Leach, M. and Newell, P. (2015) (eds) The Politics of 
Green Transformations, London: Routledge.
Simms, A. (2013) Cancel the Apocalypse: The New Path to 
Sustainability, London: Little Brown.
Solnit, R. (2004) Hope in the Dark: Untold Histories, Wild 
Possibilities, Nation Books
Smith, A. (2014) Socially Useful Production, STEPS Working 
Paper 58, Brighton: STEPS Centre
Swilling, M. and E. Annecke (2012) Just Transitions: 
Explorations of Sustainability in an Unfair World South Africa: 
UCT Press.
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